Abstract
Introduction
After recent cryptanalytic attack on MD5 [WY] and SHA-1 [WYY] , the security of their successor, SHA-2 family [NIST] , against all kinds of cryptanalytic attacks has become an important issue. Although many attacks [GH] , [MPRR] , [MPRR1] , [NB] , [IMPR] , [SS] on the reduced round of SHA-256 are published between 2003 to 2008, but no result gives any practical threat to the security of SHA-256 till now. In the mean time NIST announced SHA-3 competition in 2007 and the final SHA-3 candidate will be declared by the second quarter of this year. All hash functions submitted for the SHA-3 competition [NIST1] are divided on the following broad category: balanced Feistel network, unbalanced Feistel network, wide pipe design, key schedule, MDS matrix, output transformation, S-box and feedback register. But it is still an important issue to analyse the hash function based on the design principle of MD4 family.
We have already designed a cryptographic hash function viz. HF-hash [DMS] in which we have designed the compression function consisting of 32 polynomials with 64 variables which were taken from the first 32 polynomials of hidden field equations challenge-1 by forcing last 16 variables as 0. The leading monomials of 32 polynomials with respect to graded lexicographical ordering used in HF-hash are the following:   .  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   3  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  3  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  7  1  2  1  5  1  3  1  3  1  2  1   2  1  4  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  6  1  3  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  3  1  3  1  2  1  3  1  2 
Therefore, there are only six different leading monomials viz.
. & , , , ,
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These 32 polynomials form a minimal Groebner basis for the ideal they generate with respect to grlex ordering as well as with respect to grevlex ordering. But if any one wants to solve the system of equations formed by these polynomials, (s)he cannot reduce the number of polynomials 8  with respect to any monomial ordering with the assumption that they form a Groebner basis. So the number of equations cannot be reduced to less than 8. In this paper we prove that GB-hash is more secure than HF-hash with respect to the preimage resistance as well as the collision search attack in the subsequent sections.
GB-hash: Hash Functions Using Groebner Basis

GB-hash
GB-hash function can take arbitrary length ) 2 ( 64  of input and gives 256 bits output. We have designed GB-hash by changing the compression function. The compression function is designed by taking a set of 32 polynomials with 64 variables over GF(2) which form a minimal Groebner basis of an ideal they generate with respect to grlex or grevlex ordering; where as the compression function of HF-hash consists of 32 polynomials with 64 variables which were taken from the first 32 polynomials of hidden field equations challenge-1 by forcing last 16 variables as 0. For computation of GB-hash, we have taken the padding and parsing procedure, initial value and the 64 constants are the same as HF-hash. For completeness of the algorithm, the computation of hash value of a message M of length l bits is given below:
Padding: First we append 1 to the end of the message M. Let k be the number of zeros added for padding. The 64-bit representation of l is appended to the end of k zeros. The padded message M is shown in the following figure. Now k will be the smallest positive integer satisfying the following condition: 448 mod 383 ., . 
the following four steps are executed for all the values of i from 1 to n. 
Initialization
This is the expansion of the message blocks without padding. In the last block we apply padding rule. If 384 ) 1 (   l bits, then we have two extra blocks in the padded message. Otherwise we have one extra block in the padded message. In both the cases, we apply the following expansion rule for the last block so that the length of the message appears in the end of the padded message. 
Process of Implementation: In order to compute GB-hash(M), first the padding rule is applied and then the padded message is divided into 448-bit blocks. Now each 448-bit block is divided into fourteen 32-bit words and each 32-bit word is read in little endian format. For example, suppose we have to read an ASCII file with data "abcd", it will be read as 0x64636261.
Test Value of GB-hash
Test values of the three inputs are given below:
GB-hash(a) = f1887394 23fab8a8 0512448e 43d6755e da90c8d0 c38c38d0 db7ab991 4645e099 GB-hash(ab) = b302d927 033fd17e 1e2ff903 839e4b35 1feb55e2 fadd9f8b dca0adbf 1c719df9
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Analysis of GB-hash
In this section we present the complete analysis of GB-hash which includes properties, efficiency as well as the security analysis of this function.
Properties of GB-hash
This subsection describes the properties of GB-hash required for cryptographic applications.
i. Easy to compute: For any given value x it is easy to compute GB-hash(x) and the efficiency of this hash function is given in section 3.2. ii. One-wayness: Suppose one knows the GB-hash(x) for an input x. Now to find the value of x, (s)he has to solve the system of polynomial equations consisting of 32 polynomials with 64 variables given in the site for each round operation. Since this system of equations is underdefined, the XL [CKPS] method or any variant of XL [YC] cannot be applied to solve this system.
We will prove that this system of equations cannot be solve in polynomial time using the method described for solving underdefined system of equation in [KPG] . The bit variance test consists of measuring the impact of changing input message bits on the digest bits. More specifically, given an input message, all the small changes as well as the large changes of this input message bits occur and the bits in the corresponding digest are evaluated for each such change. Afterwards, for each digest bit the probabilities of taking on the values of 1 and 0 are measured considering all the digests produced by applying input message bit changes. If
where n is the digest length, then, the one-way hash function under consideration has attained maximum performance in terms of the bit variance test [KZ] . Therefore, the bit variance test actually measures the uniformity of each bit of the digest. Since it is computationally difficult to consider all input message bit changes, we have evaluated the results for only up to 449 files and found the following results:
Number of digests = 449 Mean frequency of 1s (expected) = 224.50 Mean frequency of 1s (calculated) = 223.72
The above analysis shows that GB-hash exhibits a reasonably good avalanche effect. Thus it can be used for cryptographic applications.
Efficiency of GB-hash
The following table gives a comparative study in the efficiency of GB-hash and HF-hash in HP Pentium -D with 3 GHz processor and 512 MB RAM.
The efficiency of GB-hash can be improved by choosing the reduced Groebner basis instead of a minimal Groebner basis.
Security Analysis
In this paper we have applied a new method for expanding a 512-bit message block into 2048-bit block. For this purpose we have to change the padding rule and the procedure of parsing a padded message. In case of MD-5, SHA-1 & SHA-256, the padded message is divided into 512-bit blocks whereas in case of GB-hash, the padded message is divided into 448-bit blocks. Then two 32-bit words are added to construct a 512-bit block as the input for each iteration, where these two words depend on the previous internal hash updates or chaining variables. So, in each iteration, the 512-bit blocks are not independent from the previous message blocks as in the case of MD-5, SHA-1 or SHA-256. Message expansion algorithm of GB-hash is dependent on www.ijmer.com 469 | P a g e the first and last word of the previous hash. Now if small change is occurred in the inputs, the intermediate hash values will be different. Thus we will get the differences in first and last words of intermediate hash values. These differences along with the rotation in the message expansion formula make impossible to find corrective pattern described in [CJ] . Thus, differential attack by Chabaud and Joux is not applicable to our hash function because one does not have any control over two 32-bit words coming from the previous internal hash updates.
Moreover, a 1-bit difference in any one of 14 initial 32-bit words propagates itself to at least 162 bits of the expanded message since we have taken the 64 round operations. Less than 70 bit difference in expanded message and input message is obtained by changing 1-bit input when 32 or 48 round operations are performed. That is why we have taken 64 round operations for GB-hash function. This makes it impossible to find corrective patterns used by Chabaud and Joux in [CJ] , due to the reason that differences propagate to other positions.
The idea of Wang et. al. for finding collision in SHA-0 [WYY1] and SHA-1 [WYY] is to find out the disturbance vectors with low Hamming weight first and then to construct a differential path. To construct a valid differential path, it is important to control the difference propagation in each chaining variable. After identifying the wanted and unwanted differences one can apply the Boolean functions (mainly IF) and the carry effect to cancel out these differences. In particular, when an input difference is 1, the output difference can be 1, -1 or 0. Hence, the function can preserve, flip or absorb an input difference. This gives a good flexibility to construct a differential path. The key of these attacks was the Boolean functions used in compression function which in combination with carry effect facilitate the differential attack.
We have replaced the Boolean functions with 32 polynomials having 64 variables, which form a Groebner basis for the ideal they generate. Now if we change 1 bit in the inputs of GB-hash, the outputs will be the same after one round of operation of the compression function. Because, this input difference will not effect since in our case W . Thus, the output differences will be found after two rounds of computing compression function. We have computed the difference propagation of chaining variables for several files having 1 bit input difference and the result is given in the following table.
This shows that it is impossible to control the difference propagation of chaining variable after round two as in the case of GBhash. Therefore, these attacks also are not applicable to GB-hash hash function. Although the cross dependence equation described by Sanadhya and Sarkar in [SS] can be formed in case of GB-hash, the procedure of message expansion as well as the compression function of GB-hash being different from SHA-2 family, this procedure for finding collision cannot be applied in our hash function. Thus, this hash function is also collision resistance against the method described by Sanadhya and Sarkar. Thus the compression function of GB-hash is collision-resistant against existing attacks. Since IV of GB-hash is fixed and the padding procedure of GB-hash includes the length of the message, therefore by Merkle-Damgard theorem [Dam] [Mer] we can say that GB-hash is collision-resistant against existing attacks.
Conclusion
In this paper a dedicated hash function GB-hash has been presented. A system of multivariate polynomials which form a minimal Groebner basis with respect to grlex or grevlex ordering is applied for designing the compression function of our proposed hash function. Analysis of this hash function viz. randomness as well as security proof are also described here. GB-hash differs from the MD family and the SHA family mainly in the procedure of message expansion and the compression function. The advantages of our proposed hash function over the most commonly used hash functions, are that the differential attack applied by Chabaud and Joux in SHA-0 as well as collision search for SHA-1 by Wang et. al. and collision search method applied by Sarkar et. al. for SHA-2 family are not applicable. Further work is going on regarding the improvement of the efficiency as well as the security of GB-hash. 
